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Abstract
In 2004, Muzereau et al. showed how to use a reduction algorithm
of the discrete logarithm problem to Diffie- Hellman problem in order
to estimate lower bound on Diffie-Hellman problem on elliptic curves.
They presented their estimates for various elliptic curves that are used
in practical applications. In this paper, we show that a much tighter
lower bound for Diffie-Hellman problem on those curves can be achieved,
if one uses the multiplicative group of a finite field as an auxiliary group.
Moreover, improved lower bound estimates on Diffie-Hellman problem
for various recommended curves are also given which are the tightest;
thus, leading us towards the equivalence of Diffie-Hellman problem and
the discrete logarithm problem for these recommended elliptic curves.
Keywords: Discrete Logarithm problem, lower bound of the Diffie-Hellman
problem, elliptic curves used in practical applications.
1 Introduction
It is well known that the discrete logarithm problem(DLP) is one of two primi-
tives that are commonly used as a building block in public key protocols, other
being integer factorization. Computational difficulty in solving DLP is a secu-
rity necessity for the protocols based on it. However, interesting thing about
these DLP-based protocols is that, security of many of such protocols does not
exactly rely on the hardness of DLP. For example, the ElGamal public key
cryptosystem is secure if and only if the Diffie-Hellman problem(DHP) is hard
to solve [4, Proposition 2.10]. That means, it is enough for an attacker to solve
DHP to break the ElGamal cryptosystem. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
pairing-based cryptosystems, digital signature schemes and many more proto-
cols are some other examples where the security of the protocol depends on
hardness on DHP. This is why hardness of DHP is of utmost importance in
public key cryptography.
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If DLP is easy, DHP is easy because a solution of DLP immediately yields a
solution of DHP. Therefore, the only meaningful scenario to study the hardness
of DHP is when DLP is known to be hard. Barring some weak elliptic curves
over finite fields, there are no efficient algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm
problem on the group of points of an elliptic curve over finite field (ECDLP) and
thus, those elliptic curves are widely used for practical purposes. Thus, it is of
paramount importance to study about the hardness of the elliptic curve Diffie-
Hellman problem(ECDHP) from the point of view of practical cryptography.
The central theme of this paper is to study the hardness of ECDHP since a
number of public key protocols are designed on such curves and their security
depends only on the hardness of ECDHP.
1.1 Summary of Existing work
To study the hardness of DHP the traditional method, and the only method
known so far, involves reduction arguments from DLP to DHP. In this section,
we will summarize those reduction arguments. In such reductions, one tries to
solve DLP efficiently(in polynomial time of the input bit), using the existence of
the a solution of DHP as sub-routine. If there exists such an algorithm, we say
that DLP reduces to DHP in polynomial time, denoted by DLP ≤P DHP.
Informally, if DLP ≤P DHP, it implies that DHP is at least as hard as DLP,
or equivalently, DLP is no harder than DHP. Clearly, existence of any such
reduction algorithm in case of elliptic curve groups would imply that ECDHP
is hard, since ECDLP is hard to solve.
The first, and the only, reduction algorithm known so far which reduces DLP
to DHP was proposed by Maurer in his seminal paper [6]. He introduced the
technique of implicit representation of elements of a finite field and indicated the
use of an auxiliary group in constructing such a reduction algorithm. Soon after
that, Maurer and Wolf showed that DLP ≤P DHP for any group G of prime
order p; if we are able to find an elliptic curve over Fp with smooth order [7–10].
Smooth order of the auxiliary elliptic curve was the main reason behind the
polynomial time reduction of DLP to DHP in their algorithm because it ensures
that the total number of group operations as well as the total number of calls
to the DH-oracle required in their algorithm remain polynomial in the input
size. However, it is exceptionally hard, in general, to construct an elliptic curve
over Fp of smooth order for large p, resulting in the failure of above theorem.
Therefore, some alternate method was needed to study the hardness of DHP.
In 2004, Muzereau et al re-visited the Maurer and Wolf reduction algorithm
of DLP to DHP for special case of elliptic curve groups over finite field [12].
They explicitly constructed auxiliary elliptic curves, which were required in
the reduction algorithm, for a number of elliptic curves recommended for prac-
tical implementation in SEC 2 [14] by Standard for Efficient Cryptography
Group(SECG) at Certicom Corporation. We will refer to those recommended
elliptic curves in SEC 2 as SECG curves [14] throughout this paper. How-
ever, the orders of the auxiliary elliptic curves constructed were not smooth
enough, making the cost of the reduction algorithm exponential. Therefore,
their reduction algorithm with those auxiliary elliptic curves failed to prove
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the polynomial reduction of ECDLP to ECDHP for those recommended SECG
curves. Nevertheless, all was not lost as it might seem, since they were the
first to give precise estimate of the number of group operations needed in such
a reduction algorithm and showed how to use such a reduction algorithm to
estimate the minimum number of group operations required to solve ECDHP
on those SECG curves [12, Table 1, Table 2].
Bentahar later applied the idea similar to Muzereau et al. but constructed
different auxiliary elliptic curves over Fp to improve those estimates of Muzereau
et al. on the exact lower bounds on ECDHP for those important SECG curves
[2, Table 1, Table 2]. Since those lower bounds on ECDHP are assumed to be
beyond the reach of present computational power, it establishes the security
of several protocols relying on the hardness of ECDHP for those recommended
SECG curves. This shows the significance of this remarkable approach.
1.2 Our Contribution
The algorithms of Muzereau and Bentahar both use the same reduction algo-
rithm suggested by Maurer and Wolf. They used suitable elliptic curves over
a finite field as auxiliary groups. Our contribution in this paper is that a new
reduction algorithm of DLP to DHP is presented which uses, for the first time,
the multiplicative group of a finite field as an auxiliary group. Our reduction
algorithm is also different from those used by Muzereau [12] and Bentahar [2] or
from any other previous reduction algorithm. Owing to this difference between
our algorithm and previous algorithms and the change in the auxiliary group
from an elliptic curve over a finite field to the multiplicative group of a finite
field; our reduction algorithm requires very small number of DH-oracle calls.
Our reduction algorithm results in increasing the lower bound on DHP, because
the lower bound on DHP is inversely proportional to the number of calls to the
DH-oracle. When applied to SECG curves studied first by Muzereau et al. and
then by Bentahar, our reduction algorithm improves the previous lower bounds
on ECDHP.
More precisely, assuming that the best algorithm to solve DLP on an elliptic
curve of order p takes at least
√
p group operations, Muzereau et al. gave the
following estimate on the lower bound on ECDHP [12, Theorem 4]:
Theorem 1. Let p be a prime. Assuming in the interval [p+1−√p, p+1+√p]
there is an integer which is product of three primes of roughly equal size, then
there exists a string S which implies that the best algorithm to solve the ECDHP
for an elliptic curve of order p takes time at least
O
( √
p
(log2p)2
)
group operations.
Under the same assumptions as above, our reduction algorithm will prove
the following theorem which improves the lower bound on ECDHP in Theorem
1:
Theorem 2. For a prime p, assume that there exists a divisor d of p − 1 of
the size roughly equal to 3
√
p. Then, the best algorithm to solve ECDHP for an
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elliptic curve of order p takes at least
O
( √
p
log2d
)
group operations.
It is important to note that both the theorems above assume that the best
known algorithm to solve ECDLP on an elliptic curve of order p requires at
least
√
p group operations.
Our result is significant as it applies to almost all the recommended SECG
curves because such a divisor d exists for almost all of those curves where
prime p is either the order of those elliptic curve groups or the largest prime
divisor(with a very small co-factor of either 2 or 4).
Moreover, for curves SECP521R1, SECT409R1, SECT571R1, SECT571K1,
Bentahar was unable to construct the auxiliary elliptic curves. However, we
had no problem applying our algorithm to these curves and the lower bound
estimates on these curves are also given here.
2 Notations and Definitions
Let < G,+ > be a cyclic(additive) group generated by P and order of P is a
prime p.
Definition 1. Given Q ∈ G, the problem of computing the integer x modulo
p such that Q = xP is called the discrete logarithm problem(DLP) with
respect to P .
Definition 2. Given Q = xP,R = yP ∈ G(x, y are unknown integers), the
problem of computing S = xyP is called the Diffie-Hellman problem(DHP)
with respect to P .
From the above definitions, it is clear that if one can compute x fromQ = xP
and then he can compute xR = xyP ∈ G. Thus, the solution of DLP readily
yields the solution of DHP. However, as discussed earlier, we are interested in
the reverse implication: does a solution of DHP solve DLP as well? To answer
this question, reduction of DLP to DHP has been suggested and also given in
some particular cases by Maurer and Wolf. As mentioned earlier, one tries to
solve DLP assuming that a solution of DHP is known, or equivalently, one has
access to a DH-oracle. We define it formally as follows:
Definition 3. A DH-oracle is a function that takes xP, yP ∈ G as inputs
and returns xyP ∈ G as output. We write it as DH(xP, yP ) = xyP .
It was great insight of Maurer and Wolf who gave the first reduction algo-
rithm that solved DLP using the DH-oracle as a sub-routine. The algorithm
used the idea of implicit representation of elements of a finite field Fp and
auxiliary groups.
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2.1 Implicit Representation of Elements of Fp
Let G be a cyclic group with generator P whose order is a prime number p.
Let y ∈ Fp. Then, yP ∈ G is called the implicit representation of y ∈ Fp(with
respect to G and P ). We denote this by y  yP .
Let yP, zP ∈ G be implicit representations of y, z ∈ Fp respectively. Then
following basic algebraic operations in Fp can also be realized in G as follows:
• Equality testing: y = z if and only if yP = zP .
• Addition: y + z  yP + zP (1 group operation in G).
• Subtraction: y − z  yP − zP (O(log p) group operations in G).
• Multiplication: y · z  yzP = DH(yP, zP ) (1 call to DH-oracle).
• Inversion: y−1 = yp−2 = y · · · y︸ ︷︷ ︸  yp−2P (O(log2p) DH-oracle calls by
using binary expansion).
Observe that the DH-oracle is used only for multiplication and inversion in
Fp. Therefore, number of DH-oracle calls required in the reduction algorithm
increases with the increase in number of multiplication and inversions in Fp
required in the reduction algorithm. We will see the importance of this in later
sections.
2.2 Auxiliary Groups
As the name suggests, any group(other than the group G) is called an auxiliary
group if it can be used to achieve the targeted goal of an algorithm. In the
present context of DLP to DHP reduction, the goal is to solve DLP using the
DH-oracle calls and implicit representations. Therefore, two essential properties
of a possible auxiliary group H are:
• Elements of H can be represented as m-tuples of elements of Fp for some
m ≥ 1.
• Group operation in this auxiliary group H can be defined from algebraic
operations in Fp.
These two necessary properties of H were suggested by Maurer and Wolf [8].
If H has these properties, then any computation in H( for example, equality
testing, exponentiation in H) can also be performed on their implicitly repre-
sented elements of G. For more details, refer to [8].
Moreover, Maurer and Wolf [8] also mentioned two classes of possible auxil-
iary groups, satisfying above requirements: elliptic curves E¯(Fp) and subgroups
of F×pn for some n ≥ 1. They called these groups applicable auxiliary groups over
Fp.
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2.3 General Idea of Solving DLP using Auxiliary Groups
and Implicit Representation Computation
Let G be a cyclic group generated by P and order of P is a prime p. To solve
DLP for Q, one requires to find the integer x where Q = xP . Moreover, we
also have access to a DH-oracle on G and we are allowed to make calls to the
DH-oracle to solve DLP on G. To this end, using auxiliary groups over Fp and
computation on implicitly represented elements of Fp, Maurer and Wolf gave
the following general idea for a DLP to DHP reduction algorithm:
1. Choose a cyclic auxiliary group H over Fp generated by ζ0.
2. Embed the unknown x into an implicitly represented element c of H.
3. Compute discrete logarithm of c with respect to ζ0 in H explicitly, using
computation(in G) of implicitly represented elements of Fp. Observe that
computing implicit representations of finite field elements is exactly the
place where the DH-oracle is used.
4. Extract the unknown x from the discrete logarithm of c with respect to
ζ0 found in the last step.
It is interesting to note that all DLP to DHP reduction algorithms known so
far are based on Maurer and Wolf’s idea of implicit representations. More
intriguing is the fact that as auxiliary groups, only elliptic curves over Fp of
smooth order have been used and studied extensively.
If we take H = E¯(Fp) as the auxiliary group with smooth order N where
elliptic curve E¯(Fp) is given by Y
2 = X3+AX+B; A,B ∈ Fp and generated by
P0 = (x0, y0) ∈ H, the reduction algorithm of Muzereau et al.(which follows the
above general idea) embeds the unknown x implicitly into c = Q0 = (x, y) ∈ H
for some y ∈ Fp. After that, the discrete logarithm k of Q0 with respect to P0
is computed explicitly using computations on implicitly represented elements.
The last step is to extract x from kP0(= Q0) which is the abscissa of the point
Q0. Observe that Q0 = (x, y) was not explicitly known before the computation
of k. However, once we have k, we can compute Q0 explicitly using P0 and k
as Q0 = kP0. Muzereau et al. first computed k modulo each prime power of
N by repeatedly applying Pohlig-Hellman algorithm on implicitly represented
elements along with exhaustive search to find a collision, then used the Chinese
Remainder Theorem to find k. Bentahar also applied the same method. We
call this several instances of Pohlig-Hellman algorithm and exhaustive search in
their reduction algorithms collectively as sub-algorithm A. For more details
on this reduction, see [12].
In the following section, we present a reduction algorithm that uses F×p as
an auxiliary group, instead of an elliptic curve over Fp.
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3 DLP to DHP Reduction Algorithm using F×p
as an Auxiliary Group
The reduction algorithm presented here is an adaptation of Cheon’s work used
to solve DLPwAI [3, Theorem 1]. Cheon analyzed the security concerns on
DLP given some additional(auxiliary) input. Much to our surprise, we found
that his algorithm fits perfectly well into the general idea of Maurer and Wolf
to reduce DLP to DHP using implicit representation with F×p as an auxiliary
group.
The immediate and important application of this connection is that it gives
us the tightest estimate known so far on the lower bound on ECDHP for those
SECG curves. We present our DLP to DHP reduction algorithm using implicit
representations and F×p as auxiliary group in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let G be a additive cyclic group generated by P ∈ G and the order
of P is a prime number p. Let Q = xP ∈ G. Then, x can be computed using
at most 2log2p
([√
p−1
d
]
+
[√
d
])
group operations and by making at most
2[log2d] calls to the DH-oracle. Here d is a positive divisor of p − 1 and [.] is
the greatest integer function.
Proof. As already discussed, the proof is based on implicit representation of
elements of Fp using H = F
×
p as the auxiliary group. Recall the unknown x will
be implicitly represented by Q = xP ∈ G. Furthermore, F×p is a cyclic group
with φ(p− 1) generators, where φ is the Euler totient function. Since a random
element in F×p is a generator with probability
φ(p− 1)
p− 1 >
1
6log(log(p− 1))
which is large enough(see [3]), it’s easy to choose a generator of F×p .
Let ζ0 be a generator of H = F
×
p , then
x = ζi00 (mod p) (1)
for some integer i0 such that 1 ≤ i0 ≤ p− 1.
We want to compute i0 explicitly and then x can be computed using above
equation. Let ζ = ζd0 (mod p). Since d|(p − 1), there exists unique cyclic sub-
group, K of H = F×p of order
p−1
d
, generated by ζ. Now as (xd)(
p−1
d ) = 1, it
implies that xd ∈ K. Therefore, there exists unique non-negative integer j with
1 ≤ j ≤ (p−1
d
)
such that
xd = ζj (mod p) (2)
Let d1 =
[√
p−1
d
]
. Since j is between 1 and p−1
d
, there exist unique non-
negative integers u1, v1 with 0 ≤ u1, v1 ≤ d1 such that j = u1d1 − v1. Plugging
this value of j in Equation 2, we get
xd = ζu1d1ζ−v1 (mod p)
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which implies,
ζv1xd = (ζd1)u1 (mod p) (3)
Recall that equality of two field elements can also be checked on their implic-
itly represented elements as follows: y = z (in F×p ) is equivalent to yP = zP
in G. Therefore, above implicit equation in F×p is equivalent to following
explicit equation in G:
ζv1 (xdP ) = (ζd1)u1P (4)
Since xd is multiplication by x with itself d times and we know P and
xP , we can compute implicit representation xdP of xd, by making at most
2[log2d] calls to the DH-oracle, using a method similar to the double-and-add
algorithm [4, Section 6.3].
Looking at Equation 4, it is clear that the elements on the left-hand side
can be computed using xdP for any value of v1 with 0 ≤ v1 ≤ d1, by repeated
addition of previous terms by ζ-times. Similarly, the elements on the right-hand
side can be computed for any value of u1 with 0 ≤ u1 ≤ d1 using P by repeated
addition of previous terms by ζd1 -times. So, we compute ζv1(xdP ) for each
v1 with 0 ≤ v1 ≤ d1 and store them. Then, we compare them with each of
right-hand side terms(similar to Baby-Step Giant-Step(BSGS) algorithm [11])
to find a match and it yields the integer j = u1d1 − v1.
Note that the non-negative integer j = u1d1 − v1 in Equation 2 is nothing
but i0 modulo
p−1
d
. Now to compute i0 modulo (p− 1) from this integer j, we
apply division algorithm on i0 with divisor
p−1
d
to get a relation between i0 and
j and it gives us, i0 =
(
p−1
d
)
t+ j for some non-negative integer t. Observe that
0 ≤ t < d, otherwise i0 ≥ p− 1, a contradiction. Therefore, the integer t can be
written uniquely as t = u2
[√
d
]
− v2 for some 0 ≤ u2, v2 ≤
[√
d
]
, again by the
division algorithm. Thus, we get the following implicit equation in H = F×p ,
x = ζ0
i0 = ζ0
j+t( p−1d ) = ζ0
jζ0
( p−1d )(u2[
√
d]−v2) (5)
which is equivalent to (
ζ0
p−1
d
)v2
x =
(
ζ0
( p−1d )[
√
d]
)u2
ζ0
j (6)
The last implicit equation in H = F×p is equivalent to the following explicit
equation in G, (
ζ0
p−1
d
)v2
(xP ) =
(
ζ0
( p−1d )[
√
d]
)u2
(ζ0
jP ) (7)
As xP and ζ0
jP0 are known, we can solve for u2, v2 by finding a match
between two sides of the Equation 7 using BSGS algorithm. This solution for
u2, v2 would give us,
i0 =
(
p− 1
d
)(
u2
[√
d
]
− v2
)
+ j
Thus, we have explicitly computed i0. Lastly, we extract the original discrete
logarithm x from this i0 and the relation x = ζ0
i0 .
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It is easy to see that it takes at most 2log2p
([√
p−1
d
])
group operations to
find a match in Equation 4 and at most 2log2p
([√
d
])
group operations to find
a match in Equation 7. Therefore, we have computed the discrete logarithm x
using at most 2log2p
([√
p−1
d
]
+
[√
d
])
group operations and by making at
most 2[log2d] calls to the DH-oracle. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Remark 1. One can get rid of the factor log2p from the above time com-
plexity using KKM improvement [5]. Then, above time complexity reduces to
2
([√
p−1
d
]
+
[√
d
])
.
Remark 2. Observe that xd is unknown in Equation 3 because x is unknown.
This makes Equation 3 an implicit equation in H = F×p . This is exactly the
place where implicit representation computation comes into play, to compute
implicit representation xdP of xd. Moreover, to compute i0 modulo (p − 1)
from the integer j, the idea used in our algorithm is from [3, Theorem 1] which
uses the division algorithm on integers along with BSGS algorithm on implic-
itly represented elements. In all, we have used Pohlig-Hellman algorithm once,
BSGS algorithm twice in our reduction algorithm. We call this single occur-
rence of Pohlig-Hellman algorithm and the use of BSGS algorithm twice in our
reduction algorithm, collectively as sub-algorithm B.
Remark 3. Our algorithm follows the general idea of DLP to DHP reduction
algorithm by Maurer and Wolf with H = F×p as the auxiliary group where the
unknown x is embedded implicitly into itself, i.e. c = x. To the best of our
knowledge, our algorithm is the first DLP to DHP reduction algorithm
that uses H = F×p as an auxiliary group but does not use the Chinese Remainder
Theorem to compute the discrete logarithm.
4 Main Results
As stated earlier, to prove computational equivalence of DLP and DHP on a
group G of prime order p, one needs to construct an elliptic curve over Fp of
smooth order. This is an exceptionally hard task. Therefore, one has to look for
some alternative ways to measure the hardness of DHP. The next best thing to
the computation equivalence of DLP and DHP would be to somehow estimate
the minimum number of group operations required to solve DHP. That is exactly
what Muzereau et al. [12] did for the elliptic curves groups recommended for
practical implementation by SECG [14]. Their idea was to construct a DLP
to DHP reduction algorithm in which total number of group operations needed
in the reduction algorithm should be insignificant when compared to the cost
of solving DLP. Once we have such a reduction algorithm, they proposed that
ratio of the cost of DLP and the number of calls to the DH-oracle needed in the
algorithm gives the minimum number of group operations any algorithm that
breaks DHP would require.
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4.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Since we are dealing with an elliptic curve of prime order p, we assume
that the best algorithm to solve elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem will
take at least
√
p group operations. First, we give the general set up of estimating
the lower bound on DHP.
Let CDLP , CDHP denote the time complexity of solving DLP and DHP
respectively. Therefore, in the view of a general DLP to DHP reduction algo-
rithm, we get CDLP = n · CDHP +M where n is the number of calls to the
DH- oracle and M is the number of group operations required in the reduction
algorithm. Now, if we assume that M ≪ CDLP , then we have:
CDHP =
CDLP −M
n
≈ CDLP
n
If we set TDH =
CDLP
n
, the number TDH is exactly what gives the minimum
number of group operations needed by any algorithm to solve DHP, assuming
M ≪ CDLP . This is how Muzereau et al. [12] estimated the minimum number
of group operations required by any algorithm that solves DHP. Of course, the
aim would be to make n as small as possible to have the value of TDH as large
as possible.
Now, we prove the lower bound on ECDHP. In case of G being an elliptic
curve group of prime order p, one can take CECDLP =
√
p under our as-
sumption. Since there is a divisor d of p − 1 such that d ≈ 3√p, then it is
easy to check that M ≤ 2
([√
p−1
d
]
+
[√
d
])
≈ 3√p, satisfying the condition
M ≪ CECDLP = √p. Since n ≤ 2[log2d], we finally get,
TDH = O
( √
p
log2d
)
.
This implies that the minimum number group operation to solve ECDHP on
any elliptic curve group of prime order p by any algorithm is of the order of
O
( √
p
log2d
)
if there exists a divisor d of (p − 1) of size approximately 3√p. This
completes the proof.
Remark 4. If we assume that a divisor d of p − 1 of size approximately 3√p
exists, then the above result shows that the cost of ECDHP is getting closer to
the cost ECDLP.
Remark 5. Note that the total number of group operations, M needed in the
reduction algorithms of Muzereau et al. [12] and Bentahar [2] was also of the
same order i.e. M ≈ 3√p. This indicates the importance of such a divisor d of
size approximately 3
√
p in our reduction algorithm.
Remark 6. While the above reduction algorithm(with F×p as an auxiliary group)
as well as the previous reduction algorithms(with E¯(Fp) as an auxiliary group)
both depend on Maurer and Wolf implicit representation computation, it is clear
that the sub-algorithm B used in our reduction algorithm and sub-algorithm
A used in previous reduction algorithms are quite different. Moreover, our re-
duction algorithm uses division algorithm to compute the discrete logarithm
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while using sub-algorithm B. On the other hand, in previous reduction al-
gorithms (which have E¯(Fp) as an auxiliary group), the Chinese Remainder
Theorem was used to compute the discrete logarithm using sub-algorithm A.
4.2 Improved value of TDH : Advantage of F
×
p over E¯(Fp)
The difference between sub-algorithm A and sub-algorithm B as well as the
change of auxiliary group from E¯(Fp) to F
×
p both have their implications on the
number of DH-oracle calls, consequently affecting the value of TDH . Since Sub-
algorithm A used in previous reduction algorithms required several iterations
of Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, one had to compute a large number of implicitly
represented elements in those reduction algorithms. Therefore, a large number
of DH-oracle calls were needed in the previous reduction algorithms. On the
other hand, our reduction algorithm while using sub-algorithm B requires only
one implicitly represented element xdP of xd ∈ F×p . This element can be com-
puted by using at most n ≤ 2[log2d] DH-oracle calls which can further be made
really small by taking small value of d.
Recall that addition operation in E¯(Fp) requires many multiplications in
Fp(one multiplication in Fp means one DH-oracle call to compute implicit rep-
resentation) and many inversions in Fp (one inversion in Fp means on average
3
2
[log2p] calls to the DH-oracle to compute implicit representation). Thus, in
terms of DH-oracle calls, computing the sum of elements in E¯(Fp) is much more
expensive than multiplying elements in F×p .
Since our main aim through this reduction algorithm is to increase the value
of TDH which is inversely proportional to number of DH-oracle calls n, it will
be nice to reduce the number of DH-oracle calls as much as possible. That is
exactly what our reduction algorithm does using sub-algorithm B and F×p as
the auxiliary group. This shows that the advantage of our reduction algorithm
over previous reduction algorithms which used sub-algorithm A and H = E¯(Fp)
as auxiliary groups, for getting improved value of TDH .
4.3 Improved Lower Bound on ECDHP for SECG curves
In this section, we study about the lower bound on ECDHP for various im-
portant elliptic curves parameters [14] and show the improvement made by
our reduction algorithm on the lower bound on ECDHP for those curves.
These curves are recommended in SEC 2 by Standard of Efficient Cryptography
Group(SECG) at Certicom Corporation to be used for practical purposes and
we have been calling those curves SECG curves. These SECG curves are divided
into two sub-categories: curves over prime fields of large odd characteristic and
curves over binary fields. The prime p denotes the order of those SECG curves
defined over prime fields of odd characteristic. For remaining SECG curves
defined over binary fields, p denotes the prime divisor of the order of the curve,
with a very small co-factor of either 2 or 4.
It should also be noted that SECG curves [14] include all curves recom-
mended by NIST [13] and the most used ones in ANSI [1]. These covers the
most commonly used curves in practice. Thus, these are important curves from
the point of view of public key cryptography.
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Muzereau et al. [12] used the value of TDH as the lower bound on group
operations to break DH-protocol and also gave the estimates for TDH on various
SECG curves. Thereafter, Bentahar [2] improved the previous values of TDH
given by Muzereauet al. and his estimates remain the best estimates till date.
Now, in our algorithm, with F×p as the auxiliary group, we have n ≤ 2[log2d]
and M ≤ 2
([√
p−1
d
]
+
[√
d
])
where d is some divisor of p − 1. As per the
discussion above, to achieve a tighter(larger) value of TDH using our reduction
algorithm, one should try to make n ≤ 2[log2d] as small as possible, which forces
d to be small as well. On the other hand, we have to make sure that M ≈ 3√p,
so that it does not violate M ≪ CECDLP = √p. It is not hard to see that for
really small value of d, M is inversely proportional to d. Therefore, too small
value of d must not be used to avoid the violation of M ≪ CECDLP = √p.
Also note that d ≈ 3√p yields M ≈ 3√p in our reduction algorithm.
Keeping all these in mind, we factored p− 1 and found that most of SECG
curves contain divisors d which are between 3
√
p and
√
p and we have taken the
smallest such d in the range 3
√
p and
√
p to compute the values in Table 1 and
2 given below. For those curves where such a divisor d does not exist, we have
chosen the largest d less than 3
√
p to compute the values in the tables.
For those choices of d, we calculated exact number of the DH-oracle calls,
n ≤ 2[log2d] using binary expansion of d. The values of n thus achieved are
significantly small as compared with the values of n shown by Bentahar [2](and
much smaller than those in the work of Muzereau et al. [12]). Consequently,
these significantly small values of n resulted in much tighter(larger)values of
TDH for all SECG curves. Therefore, it implies that we have given the tightest
lower bound, known so far, on ECDHP for all SECG curves [14] (except
SECP224K1). In other words, our results shows the gap between the cost of
ECDHP and ECDHP to be the least(known so far) for these curves and it
leads us one step closer towards the computational equivalence of ECDHP and
ECDLP for these important curves.
One additional advantage of our algorithm is that the values of M in our
algorithm are less than or of almost same order as the ones given by Bentahar [2]
for most of SECG curves.
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Table 1 : Summary of results for curves of large prime characteristic
SECP Curve log2
√
|E| log2M log2n log2TDH ADV
SECP112R1 55.89 48.34 4.59 51.30 6.90
SECP112R2 54.90 37.54 5.88 49.01 5.51
SECP128R1 64.00 43.45 6.02 57.98 5.58
SECP128R2 63.00 48.23 5.49 57.51 6.11
SECP160K1 80.00 48.39 6.55 73.45 5.45
SECP160R1 80.00 53.85 6.30 73.70 5.70
SECP160R2 80.00 47.53 6.70 73.30 5.30
SECP192K1 96.00 84.31 5.36 90.64 6.84
SECP192R1 96.00 55.51 6.97 89.03 5.23
SECP224R1 112.00 98.50 5.55 106.45 6.85
SECP224K1 - - - - -
SECP256K1 128.00 86.12 7.00 121.00 5.60
SECP256R1 128.00 86.06 7.00 121.00 5.60
SECP384R1 192.00 141.33 7.33 184.67 5.87
SECP521R1 260.50 196.26 7.67 252.83 6.03
Table 1 and Table 2 present the key values, log2M , log2n and log2TDH for
various SECG curves. The tables also have the value of log2
√
|E| which refers
to the assumed minimum cost of solving DLP in that particular SECG curve
E. The column under ADV shows the number of security bits gained by the
values of TDH in our algorithm over the previous best known values of TDH
given by Bentahar [2]. Moreover, the present algorithm works for the curves
SECP521R1, SECT571R1, SECT571K1 as well which were out of reach in
previous work due to inability to construct auxiliary elliptic curves, and Tables
1 and Table 2 give the key data for these curves as well.
It should also be remarked that the current algorithm fails for the curve
SECP224K1 as there does not exist any divisor of p − 1 of appropriate size.
Therefore, Bentahar’s result still gives the tightest value of TDH for this curve.
To understand the advantage gained by our result over the work of Ben-
tahar [2], as an example we consider the security of ECDHP for SECP256R1.
The best known algorithm at present to solve ECDLP on this curve takes on an
average 2128 group operations. Now, our algorithm implies that ECDHP can
not be solved in less than 2121.00 group operations, in contrast to 2115.40 group
operations from the work of Bentahar [2]. This shows that there is a gain factor
of 25.60 over the previous best known result given by Bentahar for the curve
SECP256R1, see Table 1. If we assume that today’s computational power is
incapable of performing 2121.00 group operations(which is considered to be true
by many), then ECDHP on the curve SECP256R1 is secure and any cryptog-
raphy protocol which rely on DHP for its security can safely be implemented
on the curve SECP256R1, under the assumption above.
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Table 2. Summary of results for curves of even characteristic
SECT Curve log2
√
|E| log2M log2n log2TDH ADV
SECT113R1 56.00 38.06 5.67 50.33 5.73
SECT113R2 56.00 38.17 5.76 50.25 5.65
SECT131R1 65.00 58.75 4.46 60.54 7.24
SECT131R2 65.00 51.57 5.43 59.57 6.27
SECT163K1 81.00 54.56 6.36 74.64 5.64
SECT163R1 81.00 54.69 6.36 74.64 5.64
SECT163R2 81.00 67.16 5.56 75.45 6.45
SECT193R1 96.00 61.74 6.76 89.25 5.45
SECT193R2 96.00 56.08 6.99 89.01 5.21
SECT233K1 115.50 79.89 6.77 108.73 5.73
SECT233R1 116.00 77.72 6.92 109.08 5.58
SECT239K1 116.00 79.70 6.87 111.63 5.63
SECT283K1 140.50 94.51 7.15 133.35 5.65
SECT283R1 141.00 94.61 7.18 133.82 5.62
SECT409K1 203.50 150.09 7.44 196.07 5.87
SECT409R1 204.00 136.70 7.66 196.34 5.64
SECT571K1 284.50 190.46 8.08 276.41 5.71
SECT571R1 285.00 190.77 8.15 276.85 5.65
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented first ever DLP to DHP reduction algorithm
on a group G of prime order p using F×p as an auxiliary group in the implicit
representation method. Earlier work used elliptic curves over Fp as auxiliary
groups. We also established the advantage of our reduction algorithm over
previously known reduction algorithms to achieve better(increased) lower bound
on the number of operations needed to solve DHP. As a consequence of our
reduction algorithm, we have presented the tightest lower bound known so
far on ECDHP for all recommended SECG curves [14](except SECP224K1).
This work is of practical significance as it provides tighter security for protocols
which depend on ECDHP for their security. Moreover, it leads us towards the
computational equivalence of DHP and DLP for these SECG curves since the
gap between the cost of DHP and DLP has been further reduced for these
curves.
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Appendices
A Elliptic curve domain parameters over prime
field
The following data present several SECG curves [1] which are defined over some
prime field of characteristic not equal to 2 and are used for practical purposes.
For these curves, prime p denotes the order of the elliptic curve group and d
is the suitable divisor of p − 1 which is used by us for various computation in
Table 1.
A.1 SECP112R1
p = 4451685225093714776491891542548933
d = 140876
A.2 SECP112R2
p = 1112921306273428674967732714786891
d = 110852811870
A.3 SECP128R1
p = 340282366762482138443322565580356624661
d = 9476076960994
A.4 SECP128R2
p = 85070591690620534603955721926813660579
d = 3101689558
1
A.5 SECP160K1
p = 1461501637330902918203686915170869725397159163571
d = 42918291593381467397
A.6 SECP160R1
p = 1461501637330902918203687197606826779884643492439
d = 22167198845997443
A.7 SECP160R2
p = 1461501637330902918203685083571792140653176136043
d = 142004808588765074419
A.8 SECP192K1
p = 6277101735386680763835789423061264271957123915200845512077
d = 43818996
A.9 SECP192R1
p = 6277101735386680763835789423176059013767194773182842284081
d = 9564682313913860059195669
A.10 SECP224K1
p = 2695994666715063979466701508701964034651032708312007454899
4958668279
Appropriate size of divisor d of p− 1 not available
A.11 SECP224R1
p = 2695994666715063979466701508701962594045780771442439172168
2722368061
d = 533642580
A.12 SECP256K1
p = 1157920892373161954235709850086879078528375642790749043826
05163141518161494337
d = 65709355417112419152054124
A.13 SECP256R1
p = 115792089210356248762697446949407573529996955224135760
342422259061068512044369
d = 71482998987075857096374359
2
A.14 SECP384R1
p = 3940200619639447921227904010014361380507973927046544666794
6905279627659399113263569398956308152294913554433653942643
d = 12895580879789762060783039592702
A.15 SECP521R1
p = 6864797660130609714981900799081393217269435300143305409394463
45918554318339765539424505774633321719753296399637136332111386476
8612440380340372808892707005449
d = 1898873518475180724503002533770555108536
B Elliptic curve domain parameters over F2m
The following data present several SECG curves [1] which are defined over a
binary field and are used for practical purposes. For these curves, prime p is
the largest divisor of the order of that particular elliptic curve group(with a
very small co-factor of either 2 or 4) and d is the appropriate divisor of p − 1
used by us for various computation in Table 2.
B.1 SECT113R1
p = 5192296858534827689835882578830703
d = 253877289037
B.2 SECT113R2
p = 5192296858534827702972497909952403
d = 215851796187
B.3 SECT131R1
p = 1361129467683753853893932755685365560653
d = 23348
B.4 SECT131R2
p = 1361129467683753853879535043412812867983
d = 485524729
B.5 SECT163K1
p = 5846006549323611672814741753598448348329118574063
d = 33118034411893094
B.6 SECT163R1
p = 5846006549323611672814738465098798981304420411291
d = 27744064547201903
3
B.7 SECT163R2
p = 5846006549323611672814742442876390689256843201587
d = 859825042
B.8 SECT193R1
p = 6277101735386680763835789423269548053691575186051040197193
d = 1697589986603916123127
B.9 SECT193R2
p = 6277101735386680763835789423314955362437298222279840143829
d = 4345632155805272808276901
B.10 SECT233K1
p = 34508731733952818937173779311385127605709409888622521263280
87024741343
d = 11064269030135607689238
B.11 SECT233R1
p = 6901746346790563787434755862277025555839812737345013555379
383634485463
d = 443484653691663066996649
B.12 SECT239K1
p = 22085588309729804119791218759286481494821656132170984888
7480219215362213
d = 912013207122974008798076
B.13 SECT283K1
p = 38853377844514581418389238136470378132848117337930613242
95874997529815829704422603873
d = 19578145037471479248182334822
B.14 SECT283R1
p = 7770675568902916283677847627294075626569625924376904889
109196526770044277787378692871
d = 34107744933314238426752172695
B.15 SECT409K1
p = 3305279843951242994759576540163855199142023414821406096
42324395022880711289249191050673258457777458014096366590617
731358671
d = 572443222870261113609193333057890
4
B.16 SECT409R1
p = 6610559687902485989519153080327710398284046829642812192
84648798304157774827374805208143723762179110965979867288366
567526771
d = 133035142307481057108300314154446543724338
B.17 SECT571K1
p = 1932268761508629172347675945465993672149463664853217499
32861762572575957114478021226813397852270671183470671280082
5351461273674974066617311929682421617092503555733685276673
d = 1650836032275210526255468059063336914554249497826676631916
B.18 SECT571R1
p = 386453752301725834469535189093198734429892732970643499865
7235251451519142289560424536143999389415773083133881121926944
486246872462816813070234528288303332411393191105285703
d = 2160677396588220552651437946338996605699043277407755096919
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